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TOP SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 4804

TS#786

EXDIS

SALT

SECSTATE PLEASE PASS SECDEF

SUBJ: SALT: NAC CONSULTATION ON NOVEMBER 15

1. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR FARLEY CONSULTED WITH COUNCIL NOVEMBER 15 ON US APPROACH TO SALT TWO. COUNCIL SUPPORTED THIS APPROACH. ALLIED QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS CONCERNED FBS, NON-TRANSFER, AND US AIM TO SEEK EQUAL AGGREGATES OF CENTRAL SYSTEMS. ALL WELCOMED US INTENTION TO CONSULT CLOSELY DURING SALT TWO WHICH ALLIES RECOGNIZED WOULD INVOLVE ISSUES OF GREATER DIRECT NATO CONCERN THAN SALT ONE. COUNCIL SUPPORTED GENERALIZED ON-CIRCUMVENTION FORMULA FOR FBS, SUBJECT TO FURTHER STUDY. IT DECIDED AGAINST NOW ASKING MC TO STUDY MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF FBS REDUCTIONS OR LIMITATIONS. COUNCIL WOULD WELCOM FURTHER CONSULTATION WHEN SITUATION WARRANTS, PERHAPS JUST BEFORE OR AFTER DECEMBER MINISTERIALS. END SUMMARY.

2. AMBASSADOR FARLEY SAID US BELIEVES THAT CONSULTATIONS WITH NATO ALLIES ON SALT TWO WILL BE JUST AS IMPORTANT AS THOSE ON SALT ONE. HE REFERRED TO THE US LETTER OF NOVEMBER 10 (STATE 204981) AND SAID HE WOULD BE GLAD TO HEAR AND REPORT ALLIED VIEWS. US WOULD TAKE AN EXPLORATORY APPROACH IN THE OPENING SESSION OF SALT TWO, COMPARABLE TO THAT AT THE BEGINNING OF SALT ONE. WHILE THE PROBLEMS THAT HAD BEEN

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SET ASIDE BY THE US-USSR AGREEMENT OF MAY 20, 1971 WERE STILL WITH US AND WOULD RE-EMERGE IN SALT TWO, THERE HAD BEEN SOME SIGNIFICANT CHANGES FROM THE SITUATION PREVAILING IN THE BEGINNING OF SALT NEGOTIATIONS. WE WERE IN NO DOUBT NOW, AS WE HAD TO BE BEFORE SALT ONE, THAT THE SOVIETS WERE SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN NEGOTIATION. ALSO, VERY FACT OF THE PREVIOUS AGREEMENTS WAS ENCOURAGING. WE KNOW MORE ABOUT SOVIET VIEWS, AND THE AGREEMENTS CONTRIBUTED TO DETERRENCE. EACH SIDE HAS A STAKE IN PUSHING AHEAD TO FURTHER AGREEMENTS IN LESS THAN FIVE YEARS IF POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, SHOULD ANYONE THINK THAT THE PREVIOUS AGREEMENTS HAD LED TO A LESSENING OF US DEFENSE EFFORTS, THE TRIDENT AND B-1 PROGRAMS SHOW THAT THE US WOULD CONTINUE THE NECESSARY SOUND PROGRAMS AND THAT THESE WOULD HAVE CONGRESSIONAL AND POPULAR SUPPORT.

3. PECK (UK) STRESSED HE WAS MOST GRATEFUL FOR THIS CONSULTATION, A SENTIMENT ECHOED BY EVERY SPEAKER. HE ALSO LOOKED FORWARD TO A MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR SMITH. THE UK RECOGNIZED THAT ISSUES OF MAJOR CONCERN THAT HAD BEEN PUT TO ONE SIDE NOW WOULD HAVE TO BE FACED. EVEN THOUGH SALT TWO-1 WOULD NOT BE SUBSTANTIVE, THE ALLIANCE DID NOT HAVE MUCH TIME BEFORE THE SOVIETS COULD BE EXPECTED TO RAISE DIFFICULT ISSUES AGAIN.

4. AS TO EQUAL AGGREGATES OF CENTRAL SYSTEMS, PEC FORESAW DIFFICULTIES REGARDING DEFINITIONS. HE ALSO WONDERED HOW LONG-RANGE BOMBERS AFFECT THE EQUALITY OF CENTRAL SYSTEMS, WHETHER THERE COULD BE A SUBSTITUTION OF SEA-BASED WEAPONS FOR LAND-BASED ONES, AND HOW TO ACHIEVE PARITY IN MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT. CONCERNING FBS, THE UK WAS GLAD THE US INTENDED TO LET THE USSR TAKE THE INITIATIVE. IT ALSO WELCOMED THE MORE PRECISE NON-CIRCUMVENTION FORMULATION WHICH WOULD, IF ATTAINABLE, BE THE BEST OUTCOME FOR THE FBS QUESTION. THE UK WAS GLAD TO SEE THAT THE US WOULD OPPOSE ANY COMPENSATION TO THE SOVIETS FOR INCREASES IN ALLIED NUCLEAR FORCES, AND THAT THE US WOULD ALSO RESIST DISCUSSION OF THE FORWARD BASING OF US SUBMARINES.

5. PECK CONTINUED BY ASKING WHETHER QUALITATIVE RESTRICTIONS MIGHT INCLUDE THOSE ON MIRVS. ALSO, WHAT OTHER QUALITATIVE

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RESTRICTIONS MIGHT THERE BE, AND WHEN MIGHT THIS SUBJECT BE BROACHED? THE UK WELCOMED THE US INTENTION TO MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT ON THE FBS AND NON-TRANSFER QUESTIONS. FOR ITS PART, THE UK WOULD CONTINUE ITS STUDIES AS A CONTRIBUTION TO NATO STUDIES OF SALT ISSUES.

6. DE STAERCKE (BELGIUM) AGREED WITH THE US AIMS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND HOPED FOR SUCCESS. AT NPG SECRETARY LAIRD HAD MENTIONED THE SOVIET "BACFIRE." DE STAERCKE ASSUMED THIS BOMBER WAS NON-CENTRAL SYSTEM. IF THE SOVIETS PRODUCED BACKFIRE TO COMPLEMENT THEIR MR/IRBMS, WOULD THEY BE INCLUDED IN ANY AGREEMENT TO LIMIT FBS? BELGIUM CONSIDERED THAT NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS SHOULD NOT BE NEGOTIATED IN MBFR. FBS CONCERNED THE WHOLE OF THE ALLIANCE, NOT ONE REGION OF IT AS MBFR DOES, AND THEREFORE MORE APPROPRIATE FOR US-USSR BILATERAL NEGOTIATION.

7. CATALANO (ITALY) WELCOMED US POSITION ON FBS AND NON-TRANSFER. THE ADVANTAGE OF THE EQUAL AGGREGATES APPROACH WOULD BE TO KEEP FBS AND ALLIED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS OUT OF SALT. THESE SYSTEMS, IN TURN, COULD NOT BE SEPARATED FROM MR/IRBMS. ITALY THOUGHT THE GENERALIZED FORMULA WAS A GOOD ONE, BUT IT SHOULD INCLUDE MR/IRBMS. SALT TWO WOULD INVOLVE ISSUES OF DIRECT MAJOR CONCERN TO THE ALLIES, AND ITALY WOULD WISH TO CONTRIBUTE TO INTENSIFIED CONSULTATIONS.

8. SPIEREBURG (NETHERLANDS) WELCOMED US POSITIONS FOR SALT TWO. HE READ FROM A NETHERLANDS PAPER (POUCHED) CONTAINING ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE INCLUSION OF FBS IN SALT. THESE INCLUDED FACT THAT THE FBS PLAY A ROLE IN EUROPEAN DEFENSE AND COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED APART FROM ANY MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. THE US ROLE IN THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE SHOULD BE SEEN IN LIGHT OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, BY VIRTUE OF WHICH ANUMBER OF EUROPEAN ALLIES HAVE RENOUNCED ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IF FBS WERE CONSIDERED IN SALT, MR/IRBMS SHOULD ALSO BE CONSIDERED, WHICH WOULD LOGICALLY BRING A THIRD PARY (SIC; FRANCE) INTO SALT NEGOTIATIONS. THE NETHERLANDS THOUGHT THE GENERALIZED FORMULA SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO MEET SOVIET CONCERNS, BUT THERE WOULD BE A NEED FOR A PRECISE UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT WEAPONS AND SYSTEMS ARE INCLUDED, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME MAINTAINING ALLIANCE FLEXIBILITY.

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9. DE ROSE (FRANCE) ASKED BY DR. KISSINGER HAD THOUGHT  
IN PRESS CONFERENCE COMMENT THAT SALT TWO MIGHT PERHAPS BE  
EASIER TO NEGOTIATE THAN SALT ONE. ALSO, WHAT CHANGES WOULD  
VIOLATE THE SPIRIT OR LETTER OF NON-CIRCUMVENTION FORMULA?

10. KRAPF (FRG) FORESAW A NEED FOR EVEN MORE ACTIVE EUROPEAN  
PARTICIPATION DURING SALT TWO SINCE EUROPEAN INTERESTS  
WOULD BE MUCH MORE INVOLVED IN THIS PHASE. HE SUGGESTED THE  
ALLIES MIGHT PREPARE MORE INVOLVED IN THIS PHASE. HE  
SUGGESTED THE ALLIES MIGHT PREPARE WRITTEN DOCUMENTS TO  
ELICIT WRITTEN COMMENTS FROM THE US AS AN AID IN CONSULTATIONS.  
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T O P S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 4804

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SALT

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11. MENZIES (CANADA) NOTED A PERMANENT OFFENSIVE AGREEMENT WAS THE LOGICAL NEXT STAGE IN SALT, AND HOPED THAT BOTH REDUCTIONS AND QUALITATIVE RESTRAINTS COULD BE INCLUDED. AS TO EQUAL AGGREGATES, WAS THERE NOT MORE PRECISION AND RIGIDITY HERE THAN IN THE PREVIOUS CONCEPT OF "SUFFICIENCY"? WOULD THIS NOT INCREASE NEGOTIATING PROBLEMS? HAD THERE BEEN A CHANGE IN US STRATEGIC THINKING? IF FBS WERE EXCLUDED FROM SALT, WHERE WOULD THESE SYSTEMS FIT IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS? IN MBFR, OR WHERE?

12. STEINHOFF (MC) SAID THE FBS QUESTIONS REQUIRED CAREFUL ATTENTION IN PREPARATION FOR SOVIETS RAISING IT IN SALT TWO OR MBFR. DUE WEIGHT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF ANY REDUCTION OF ALLIANCE NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES, SINCE THESE SYSTEMS WERE DUAL CAPABLE. WOULD THE COUNCIL LIKE TO ASK THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES TO BEGIN SUCH A STUDY NOW?

13. FARLEY SAID HE HAD TAKEN CAREFUL NOTE OF THE OBSERVATIONS AND WOULD ADDRESS HIMSELF PRIMARILY TO THE QUESTIONS THAT HAD BEEN RAISED. AS TO THE SCHEDULE OF NEGOTIATIONS, WE DO NOT HAVE A SET TIME FOR THE SECOND SESSION OF SALT TWO, BUT THIS WOULD PRESUMABLY BEGIN IN THE EARLY PART OF NEXT YEAR. THE US WOULD TRY TO GET AS MUCH INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE

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ON THE SOVIET APPROACH AND ON ANY FLEXIBILITY IN IT IN ORDER TO ASSIST IN FORMULATING US APPROACHES. FBS, INTER-RELATIONSHIP WITH MBFR, AND NON-TRANSFER MIGHT BE EASIER TO CONSIDER IN THE LIGHT OF INFORMATION OBTAINED OVER THE NEXT WEEKS. IN ITS BROAD STUDIES, THE US HAD FOUND IT WOULD NEED AN EXPLORATORY SESSION TO JUDGE WHAT WOULD BE NEGOTIABLE.

14. CONCERNING EQUAL AGGREGATES OF CENTRAL SYSTEMS, HE NOTED THIS WAS THE APPROACH WE HAD FOLLOWED FROM AUGUST 1970 UNTIL MAY 1971, AND DID NOT REPRESENT ANY NEW "RIDIDITY". EACH SIDE HAD VARIOUS SYSTEMS, ICBMS, SLBMS, BOMBERS, FBS, MR/IRBMS, SLCMS AND THE LIKE WHICH WERE NOT SYMMETRICAL ON EACH SIDE. WE PROPOSED THE EQUAL AGGREGATES APPROACH TO TRY TO SEPARATE OUT THOSE SYSTEMS WITH A CLEAR STRATEGIC ROLE. THERE WAS ALSO A POLITICAL CASE FOR EQUALITY IN ANY AGREEMENT ON CENTRAL SYSTEMS.

15. THERE WAS SOME LOGIC TO THE SOVIET POINTS ON NON-TRANSFER AND FBS. IT WOULD NOT BE RIGHT FOR THE US AND USSR TO LIMIT THEIR CENTRAL SYSTEMS BUT TO SUPPLY THEIR ALLIES WITH LARGE NUMBER OF CENTRAL OR EVEN OF NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS, OR TO SHIFT THEIR OWN EFFORTS TO BUILDING THEIR OWN NON-LIMITED NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS. A NON-CIRCUMVENTION FORMULA COULD ONLY BE EFFECTIVELY ADDRESSED AFTER THE MAIN AGREEMENT HAD BEEN WORKED OUT. WE ENVISAGE A FAIRLY GENERAL FORMULATION

16. ON EQUAL AGGREGATES AND SUBSTITUTION OF ONE WEAPONS SYSTEM FOR ANOTHER, ALL PROPOSALS ADVANCED HAVE ENVISAGED SOME FREEDOM-TO-MIX. THERE WERE DIFFICULTIES IN TRYING TO PUT LIMITS ON SPECIAL FORMS OF DEPLOYMENTS. FOR EXAMPLE THE US WISHED TO LIMIT LARGE SOVIET ICBMS, WHICH WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO VERIFY IF NEW ICBM SILOS COULD BE CONSTRUCTED. PERHAPS THERE COULD BE AGREEMENT TO ALLOW THE SUBSTITUTION OF SEA-BASED MISSILES FOR LAND-BASED ONES, BUT NOT VICE VERSA.

17. STRATEGIC BOMBERS ARE AN IMPORTANT STRATEGIC FACTOR, AND THE US ENJOYS A PRESENT SUPERIORITY HERE ON THE ORDER OF 550 TO 150. THIS SUPERIORITY COULD BE A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN NEGOTIATING TOWARD EQUAL AGGREGATES. BOMBERS ARE NOW IMPORTANT TO THE STRATEGIC BALANCE AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE IN THE FUTURE.

18. FARLEY REFERRED TO IDEAS ADVANCED BY SOME THAT THE US HAD

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"GIVEN" THE SOVIETS ADVANTAGES IN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. IN FACT, THE US HAD PUT A CEILING ON SOVIET MISSILE PROGRAMS THAT WERE PROCEEDING TO HIGHER LEVELS. ON THE OTHER HAD, THE AGREEMENT REFLECTED THE FACT THAT US STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE LAUNCHER LEVELS HAD BEEN STABLE FOR SOME TIME, AND US OFFENSIVE PROGRAMS SUCH AS MIRVS AND MODERNIZATION WERE NOT STOPPED OR CUT BACK.

19. THE SOVIETS OBVIOUSLY RECOGNIZZN THAT THE INTERIM FREEZE WAS NOT A FULL AGREEMENT. THEY HAD THUS FOR EXAMPLE NOT PUSHED FOR A NON-TRANSFER CLAUSE IN IT.

20. IN THE COMING NEGOTIATIONS, THE SOVIETS COULD BE EXPECTED TO TRY TO TAKE DEBATING ADVANTAGE OF THE NUMERICAL LIMITS AGREED IN THE FREEZE, BUT THE NEGOTIATING HISTORY OF SALT ONE TOGETHER WITH THE JOING DECLARATION IN MOSCOW SUPPORTS OUR POSITION REGARDING EQUALITY IN ENDURING AGREEMENTS.

21. AS TO QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS, THE US MIGHT ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE PARITY IN MISSILE THROW-WIEGHT, BUT WE DID NOT NOW KNOW HOW TO APPROACH THE PROBLEM. OUR AIM IS TO OBTAIN A MORE STABLE STRATEGIC SITUATION. SINCE THE VULNERABILITY OF LAND-BASED MISSILES IS DESTABILIZING, AND PART OF THE PROBLEM STEMS FROM LARGE THROW-WEIGHTS, ESPECIALLY AS MIRVS ARE DEPLOYED, IT IS DESIRABLE TO FIND A SOLUTION.

2. CONCERNING "BACKFIRE", PART OF THE PROBLEM IS TO DETERMINE WHETHER THIS BOMBER IS INTERCONTINENTAL AND STRATEGIC, OR A MEDIUM BOMBER FOR THEATER WAREFARE, OR SOMETHING IN BETWEEN. THE ASWER TO THIS QUESTION WILL BEAR ON OUR APPROACH TO "BACKFIRE".

23. FARLEY THOUGHT THE SOVIET POSITION ON THE FORWARD BASING OF US SUBMARINES WAS PRIMARILY POLITICALLY MOTIVATED. CHAGING TECHNOLOGY PLAYED A ROLE HERE. AS THE SOVIETS OBTAIN LONGER RANGE SUBMARINES AND SLBMS THE US ADVANTAGE FROM FORWARD BASING WILL DIMINISH IN IMPORTANCE.

24. FARLEY SAID IT WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT TO HAVE ALLIED VIEWS ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP OF FBS AND MBFR. THE US HAD NOT INTRODUCED FBS IN SALT. THE SOVIETS HAD DONE SO, WOULD DOUBTLESS RAISE THE MATTER AGAIN, AND MIGHT NOT BE RECEPTIVE

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TO SHIFTING THE TOPIC FROM SALT TO MBFR. AS FOR THE MERITS, WE SHOULD KEEP IN MIND THAT THE MBFR REDUCTION AREA INCLUDES CERTAIN FBS LOCATIONS BUT NOT THOSE OF MR/IRBMS. WE SHOULD BE CAUTIOUS ABOUT TAKING WHAT MAY SEEM TO BE AN EASY SOLUTION OF SUGGESTING THAT FBS BE CONSIDERED ONLY IN MBFR.

25. AS TO THE DIFFICULTY OF NEGOTIATING IN SALT TWO, WE HAVE LEARNED SOME THINGS AND HAVE THE EXPERIENCE OF SALT ONE TO DRAW UPON. WE HOPE TO REACH AGREEMENT IN LESS THAN FIVE YEARS, BUT IT WILL NOT BE EASY.

26. CONCERNING NON-CIRCUMVENTION, OUR FORMULATION MAY BE THE ONLY KIND THAT COULD BE NEGOTIATED. IT IS NOT SPECIFIC AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS ON THE ALLEGEDLY INJURED PARTY. NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS ARE NOT BEING GREATLY INCREASED, EVEN THOUGH THEY ARE BEING MODERNIZED. WE WOULD WANT TO BE SURE THAT THERE WAS NO PROHIBITION AGAINST TEMPORARY REINFORCEMENTS, EXERCISES, AND MOVES WE MIGHT WISH TO TAKE IN CRISIS SITUATIONS.

27. BANS OR LIMITS ON QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS ARE VERY DIFFICULT TO DEFINE AND NEGOTIATE. IN THE PAST THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT ACCEPT A MIRV BAN WHEN WE WERE FAR AHEAD IN THIS FIELD. VERIFICATION IS ALSO DIFFICULT. TESTING IS ONE STAGE WHERE WE COULD IN THE RIGHT CIRCUMSTANCES DETECT CHEATING, BUT TESTING PROCEDURES COULD BE CHANGED SO AS TO FRUSTRATE VERIFICATION. AS A SPECIFIC EXAMPLE, A MIRV LIMITATION RELATED TO LAND-BASED SYSTEMS AND NOT SEA-BASED ONES MIGHT MEAN THAT THE SOVIETS COULD TEST IN THE SEA-MODE AND THEN MAKE THE NECESSARY ADAPTATIONS TO LAND-BASED MISSILES.

28. THERE IS A DILEMMA BETWEEN THE FACT THAT CONSISTENT TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IS A THREAT TO STABILITY WHEREAS SOME MODERNIZATION IS NECESSARY TO KEEP THE DETERRENT SOUND.

29. DE ROSE ASKED ABOUT VERIFICATION AND ON-SITE INSPECTION. FARLEY REPLIED THAT WE HAVE NO EXPECTATION THAT THE SOVIETS WILL ABANDON THEIR OPPOSITION TO ON-SITE INSPECTION. WHEN WE SPOKE OF "NATIONAL MEANS", HOWEVER, WE WERE SPEAKING OF THE WHOLE RANGE OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE GATHERING MEANS.

30. DEPUTY SYG PANSA ASKED WHETHER THE COUNCIL WOULD LIKE

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TO REQUEST THE MILITARY COMMITTEE TO PREPARE A STUDY ON  
THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF FBS LIMITATIONS FOR NATO STRATEGY.  
SPIEREBURG WITH SUPPORT FROM DE STAERCKE STRONGLY OPPOSED  
SUCH A STUDY NOW AS PREMATURE AND POSSIBLY COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE.  
THE QUESTION WAS THEREFORE DEFERRED FOR THE TIME BEING.

31. AS TO FURTHER CONSULTATION, THE COUNCIL BRIEFLY CONSIDERED  
THE POSSIBILITY OF A MEETING SHORTLY AFTER THE OPENING OF  
SALT TWO. HOWEVER THE CONSENSUS WAS THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF  
A MAJOR CHANGE IN THE US NEGOTIATING APPROACH OR SOME OTHER  
SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT, ANOTHER CONSULTATION MIGHT BE  
MORE APPROPRIATE JUST BEFORE OR AFTER THE DECEMBER MINISTERIALS.

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